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In 1958, Walter O'Malley moved his baseball team from Brooklyn
to Los Angeles.' This franchise relocation affected professional
sports leagues 2 in two significant ways: it expanded the market for
professional sports to cities on the west coast 3 and altered the rela-
tionship between sports franchises and their communities.
O'Malley moved his team not because of a lack of support from
either the team's fans or the city-traditional justifications for
franchise movement-but rather in hopes of higher financial
returns .4
Thirty years later, owners are still moving their teams in search of
the best deal and not the best fans. During the period from 1981 to
1986, team owners in more than 25 American cities confronted their
hosts with demands for increased public subsidies-demands often
accompanied by threats of relocation. 5 Owners can use threats of
relocation to gain an advantage during stadium lease negotiations
because they control the supply of teams. Because there is no free
entry into the market, a competitive market for sports franchises
* The author would like to thank Andrew Marovitz, Jack Goldsmith, and Nina Men-
delson for their editorial assistance and moral support.
1. Wong, Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and Competition in Professional
Team Sports: The Ultimate Political Football?, 9 Seton Hall Legis. J. 7, 24-25 & n. 68
(1985).
2. A professional sports league is a voluntary organization which provides an institu-
tional structure within which a champion can be determined from among the member
teams. Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38
Law & Contemp. Probs. 42, 43 (1973). This Current Topic discusses the franchise
movements within four professional sports leagues: the National Basketball Association
(NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), and the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL).
3. Id. at 49.
4. Wong, supra note 1, at 22-25. See also Roberts, Lamp of Experience, Society,
May/June 1986, at 21, 22; Quirk, supra note 2, at 52.
5. Johnson, Balancing Interests, Society, May/June 1986, at 11.
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does not exist. Moreover, exemptions from federal antitrust laws
have diminished market forces thatwould lead the owners to in-
crease the supply of franchises to meet the demand. The following
descriptions of the experiences of Irwindale, California; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Jacksonville, Florida, with franchise movement detail
the potential impact of relocation on city coffers and taxpayer
pocketbooks.
In 1987, Irwindale acquired a professional football franchise by
luring the Raiders from Los Angeles. Prior to this acquisition, local
officials successfully convinced Home Savings & Loan and the Miller
Brewing Company to relocate their national headquarters to
Irwindale, a town once known only for its gravel pits. 6 However,
these industry moves neither matched the celebration caused by the
announcement that the Raiders were coming to town, 7 nor involved
the high level of risk inherent in the Raiders deal. In exchange for
the opportunity to host the Raiders, city officials offered Raiders
owner Al Davis a package worth over $110 million;8 a package that
included a non-refundable payment to Davis of $10 million, or ap-
proximately $10,000 for every citizen. 9
While the Raiders deal represents a large potential loss to
Irwindale taxpayers, the taxpayers in Baltimore have already been
hit twice by relocation. In 1982, Baltimore Colts owner Robert Ir-
say intimated that he was interested in the Los Angeles market just
as that city was looking for a team to replace the Rams, who had
relocated thirty miles to the south in Orange County.' 0 To keep the
6. Irwindale-From Pits to "Big Leagues," L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1987, at 28 (Orange
County ed.).
7. Id. at 1. The Raiders will begin playing in Irwindale in 1990.
8. Total taxpayer commitment could reach $170 million when access roads and debt
service are counted. L.A. Hopes Deal for Raiders Fails, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1987, at 1
(Orange County ed.).
9. Fulton, Desperately Seeking Sports Teams, Governing, Mar. 1988, at 34. The
population of Irwindale is approximately 1,000. L.A. Times, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Roberts, supra note 4, at 23. In 1982, to compensate for the loss of the Los
Angeles Rams to Orange County, the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission lured Al Davis
to move his franchise from Oakland to Los Angeles. To attract the Raiders, the Coli-
seum was forced to operate at a deficit for the first time in its history. Suddenly Every-
one Wants to Build a Superdome, Business Week, Dec. 5, 1983, at 110, 112 [hereinafter
Superdome]. The Raiders had received substantial support from the Oakland commu-
nity; they had played the previous twelve years at home before sellout crowds. Efiler,
Off-the-Field Goals, Pub. Rel. J., Jan. 1988, at 17, 24. However, Al Davis moved his
team to Los Angeles in return for major stadium concessions and the potential pay-off
from the Los Angeles pay-television market. Roberts, supra note 4, at 23. As of this
writing, franchise owners must pool revenue from broadcast television, while profits
from the cable market need not be shared. Thus, Davis had a strong profit motive to





Colts in Baltimore, local officials offered Irsay a five-year lease and
$24 million in stadium improvements, which he accepted."
Although Baltimore officials were able to overcome Irsay's first at-
tempt at relocation, they were not successful five years later when
the lease expired. At the end of the lease, in what has since become
a widely publicized departure, Irsay moved his team to Indianapolis,
a city which had been actively seeking a franchise.1 2 Subsequently,
in an effort to acquire another football team, Maryland officials of-
fered William Bidwell $216 million to relocate his Cardinals from
St. Louis to Baltimore. Bidwell, however, relocated his team
elsewhere. 
13
Indianapolis serves as the role model for cities like Jacksonville
that are pursuing the economic and intangible benefits inherent in
association with a sports franchise. 14 Jacksonville offers any poten-
tial owner an 82,000 seat stadium plus promises of a new training
facility, sky boxes, and a $125.8 million guarantee.15 Cities like Jack-
sonville make threats of relocation credible, thus enabling owners to
extract costly concessions from their current hosts. For example, the
Houston Oilers used Jacksonville's multi-million dollar offer of
guaranteed stadium revenues and gate receipts as a threat to force
renegotiation of their lease at the Astrodome.16
Ultimately local taxpayers are financially accountable for the ac-
tions taken by their local officials when negotiating with sports
franchises.' 7 Fans do not support their teams exclusively through
11. Roberts, supra note 4, at 23.
12. Indianapolis officials had supported the construction of a $77 million publicly-
financed sports facility, even though no team had committed to play in the stadium.
Superdome, supra note 10, at 112. The investment made by the city paid off, but it was
fortunate. St. Petersburg, Florida is the latest city to build a sports arena despite not
having a major tenant. This stadium, financed with an $85 million bond issue and
named the Florida Suncoast Dome, has been called everything from a "terrible mistake"
to "fiscal har[e]-k[a]ri" by stadium experts. Fulton, supra note 9, at 34. In spite of these
gloomy forecasts, St. Petersburg might obtain a team; the Chicago White Sox baseball
organization is rumored to be interested. USA Today, Mar. 28, 1988, at C 11.
13. Fulton, supra note 9, at 34. Bidwell moved his team to Phoenix. This move was
approved by the league owners on March 15, 1988. NFL Approves Cardinals' Move,
L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, § III, at I (Orange County ed.).
14. For further descriptions of these benefits, see infra text accompanying notes 23-
26.
15. Deford, This Bud's Not For You, Sports Illustrated, Nov. 2, 1987, at 67, 68.
16. Fulton, supra note 9, at 36.
17. The events in Irwindale, Baltimore, and Jacksonville are not unique. Since 1950
more than 68 franchises in the professional leagues have relocated. Johnson, Municipal
Administration and the Sports Franchise Relocation Issue, Pub. Admin. Rev., Nov./Dec.
1983, at 520. Several teams have relocated more than once. In 1953, the Boston Braves
moved to Milwaukee; thirteen years later they moved to Atlanta. In 1955, the Philadel-
phia Athletics moved to Kansas City; twelve years later they moved to Oakland. In 1982,
the Oakland Raiders moved to Los Angeles. In 1990, the Raiders will begin playing
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team-related revenues; their tax dollars build and operate the stadi-
ums where franchises play. Because the majority of the facilities
used by sports franchises are publicly owned,' 8 the impact of reloca-
tion on taxpayer pocketbooks is already great and could become
greater. 19
The resolution of the policy issues raised by franchise relocation
is likely to shape the way the federal government applies antitrust
laws to professional sports. 20 Further, because parallels exist be-
tween sports franchise movement and plant closings and reloca-
tions, the congressional response to this issue may have implications
for non-sport industries.2i Therefore, policy makers, even those ap-
athetic about sports, cannot ignore franchise movement. This Cur-
rent Topic argues that the federal government must become
involved in the relocation issue in order to protect cities and their
taxpayers from the exorbitant demands of franchise owners and
proposes a market-sensitive regulatory solution to the policy issues
arising from the relocation of a franchise. By mandating that every
stadium lease include conditions which create a notification provi-
sion, set mandatory minimums for owner contribution and length of
lease, and, upon relocation, require a franchise owner to reimburse
the local municipality for any investment in remodeling, the federal
government can protect the interests of the fans left behind when a
franchise leaves town.
22
their home games in Irwindale. The St. Louis Cardinal football team is the latest addi-
tion to this group. They moved to St. Louis from Chicago in 1960. They will play the
1988 football season, not in St. Louis, but in Phoenix.
For more detailed examples of the effects of relocation on cities, see Baade, Is There
an Economic Rationale for Subsidizing Sports Stadiums?, Heartland Pol'y Study, Feb.
23, 1987, at 1, 9 (New Orleans, Toronto, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Baltimore); Aim,
Sports Stadiums: Is the U.S. Overdoing it?, U.S. News & World Report, May 21, 1984,
at 51 (Buffalo, San Francisco, New York, and Atlanta).
18. Of the 94 facilities used by professional football, baseball, hockey, and basketball
teams since 1953, 67 are or were publicly owned. Baade, supra note 17, at 2. More than
50 state and local governments have spent six billion taxpayer dollars to build or refur-
bish stadiums in the past twenty years. Aim, supra note 17, at 51.
19. As the gap between the desire for franchises and their supply has grown, authori-
ties have begun to spend tens of millions of taxpayer dollars to build sports stadiums
even before an expansion franchise has been granted or the owner of an existing
franchise had agreed to play in the stadium. AIm, supra note 17, at 51; Johnson, The
Sports Franchise Relocation Issue and Public Policy Responses, in Government and
Sport 230 (A. Johnson &J. Frey eds. 1985).
20. Johnson, supra note 19, at 222. For a discussion of the antitrust implications of
sport, see infra text accompanying notes 53-62.
21. Johnson, supra note 17, at 519.
22. For further discussion of this regulatory approach, see infra text accompanying
notes 82-91. Two authors have suggested the appropriateness of attacking the reloca-
tion problem through the stadium lease. Meggyesy, The National Football League Mo-




To support the proposition that federal intervention to protect
taxpayer investment in sports franchises is both necessary and
proper, this Current Topic begins by describing the reasons munici-
pal officials demand sports teams. It then discusses past govern-
mental actions that have effectively limited the supply of sports
teams and put local officials at a disadvantage in bargaining with
team owners. Before concluding with a proposal designed to pro-
tect taxpayers by creating an artificially competitive market, this
Current Topic reviews past judicial decisions and legislative at-
tempts to regulate the movement of sports franchises and examines
why those attempts are insufficient.
L The Demand Side: Why Acquire A Sports Franchise?
Many cities want to host sports franchises because they provide a
city with both tangible and intangible benefits.23 Host cities receive
direct economic benefits from rental income, tax revenue, and em-
ployment opportunities. Indirect economic benefits accrue from in-
dustries necessary to support a team, such as food, lodging, and
transportation, and from the business created by the influx of fans
into the surrounding community.2 4 Moreover, identification as a
professional sports city adds immeasurable prestige and creates an
environment that attracts non-sport industries. 25 In addition, a
neither author explains why the league structure renders this the only solution that can
overcome market inequities, nor why involvement by the federal government is neces-
sary to implement this solution. This Current Topic addresses these questions.
23. Some argue that only the benefits and not the costs inherent in a sports franchise
are considered by a city. Costs incurred by a host community include debt service, oper-
ational expenditures, foregone property tax revenues, cost of police protection, traffic
control, sanitation, and the opportunity costs of land use. Johnson, supra note 5, at 11-
12. See also Baade, supra note 17, at 12-18 (spending on sports merely displaces spend-
ing on other sorts of services). Others argue against public financing of sports facilities
on the ground that it represents nothing more than a wealth transfer from the local
taxpayer to the wealthy team owner. Axthelm & Murr, Rx for Cities: Build a Dome,
Newsweek, Dec. 28, 1987, at 21.
24. These benefits can amount to millions of dollars annually. For example, $8 mil-
lion was infused into the Baltimore economy per home game during the 1983 World
Series; a Denver group has projected that a major league baseball team would add an
additional $70 million to its economy; and the Pittsburgh Steelers generate $11 million
in revenues during their home season. Superdome, supra note 10, at 112. The Pitts-
burgh Pirates contribute $37 million to the local economy every home season, and the
Indianapolis Colts generated an additional $21 million for the Indianapolis community.
Aim, supra note 17, at 52. The City of Oakland estimates that its economy has lost $30
million annually due to the departure of the Raiders. Wong, supra note 1, at 31.
25. Aim, supra note 17, at 51; Axthelm & Murr, supra note 23, at 2 1; Johnson, supra-
note 19, at 222-23. Johnson has also suggested that there is a potential downside for a
city to be associated with a franchise; that franchise might be lousy. Johnson, supra note
5, at 12. However, the team's fortunes-and therefore the city's--can change in just one
season.
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sports franchise can unite divergent local communities by providing
a source of urban identification and pride.26
A teamless city may obtain a franchise through creation of a new
league, expansion of an existing league, or acquisition of a franchise
located in another city. 27 The first two alternatives have proven to
be ineffective methods of acquiring a professional sports team. Op-
eration of a franchise in a new league, either in a new sport or in
competition with an established league, is financially very risky.28
Expansion of an existing league is equally unreliable; it may require
years of lobbying before the league agrees to expand.2 9 Thus,
teamless cities are forced to compete against one another for ex-
26. Roberts, supra note 4, at 22. Owners are aware that local officials perceive the
loss of a franchise as a real financial and psychological setback and capitalize on this
feeling when negotiating to gain lease concessions. Id. at 23. "Have you heard of
Brooklyn since the Dodgers left?" Alm, supra note 17, at 52 (quoting Oakland City At-
torney Dave Self); "Yes, what do you want to become, a cold Omaha?" Superdome,
supra note 10, at 110 (quoting the response of late Vice President Hubert Humphrey to a
question asking if he thought keeping the Twins and the Vikings in Minneapolis was
important).
27. Johnson, supra note 5, at 12.
28. Only through merger with an established league can a city hosting a new league
franchise obtain the benefits of being perceived as a big league city. Johnson, supra note
5, at 13. Since 1960, six new leagues have been attempted. Out of these six leagues,
franchises from only three were admitted into the league against which they competed.
Johnson, supra note 19, at 227. Thus, with assignment of a franchise in a new league,
there was at least a small hope that one franchise would break into the major leagues.
In addition, new leagues are risky. Excluding the USFL, the four expansion leagues
formed after 1960 that lasted at least two years experienced over fifty franchise reloca-
tions and failures. Johnson, supra note 5, at 12. Although theoretically possible, acquisi-
tion by expansion is not likely to meet a city's demand for big league status or for a
return to glory. The founders of arena football, 6'-4"-and-under basketball, and la-
crosse leagues stressed that their goals were to keep costs down and to offer no big
league hopes. Teams in these leagues expect fewer spectators and field teams in cities
located close to one another. Thus, franchises are available, but the product is not the
same. Who Wants to Start Another Pro League?, Fortune, July 20, 1987, at 12. The 6'-
4"-and-under basketball league has now folded, showing that even minimal expectations
might be too high for such new leagues. Youngman, Folding a Fitting Punch Line for
Little League's Brief Run, Orange County Register, Apr. 14, 1988, at C2 (evening ed.).
29. Franchise owners must approve every league expansion, and they have little in-
centive to do so. They can afford not to expand into cities that could support a franchise
because it is difficult for a rival league to become established. Further, by not expanding
into every city, the owners keep the demand for existing franchises higher than the sup-
ply, thus raising market values. Before the NBA announced plans to locate four new
franchises in Minneapolis, Orlando, Charlotte, and Miami (Fulton, supra note 9, at 35),
only six teams were created through expansion in the professional leagues during the
past twelve years. Johnson, supra note 19, at 228. Currently, there are no announced
plans for either MLB or the NFL to expand. Aim, supra note 17, at 51-52. However, a
panel of U.S. Senators has declared that they will re-examine baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion if Commissioner Peter Ueberroth does not respond to their request for MLB to
consider expansion. Hardball in Capitol, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1988, at D23. Thus, for a
city to acquire a franchise through expansion, city officials must lobby league officials




isting franchises.30 The result of this competition is increased tax-
payer liability.3 ' Liability is increased as a consequence of
concessions made by municipal authorities because owners are able
to play one city's offer against another's.3 2 Sports franchise reloca-
tion would not pose the problem that it does for cities and taxpayers
if there existed a viable means of increasing the supply of teams.
However, the structure of professional leagues enables owners to
keep the supply of sports teams below the level of demand.
33
II. The Supply Side: Sports Leagues As Markets
Professional sports leagues, because of the unique characteristics
of their product, maintain monopolistic practices that would not
serve public policy goals if allowed in non-sport industries.3 4 Non-
competition in the business dealings between rival teams is a special
requirement of sport. Leagues sell competition on the field, and
this competition must be perceived as honest. Team playing
strengths must be relatively balanced in order to draw public sup-
port.3 5 Yet, ironically, to produce balanced competition leagues
generally cannot allow individual teams to compete against one an-
other in the business world. In light of the nature of the sports
product, leagues have sought and received the right to control the
geographical location of member franchises, regulate player assign-
ments, pool television revenues and gate receipts, and establish
rules and sanctions to ensure the equality of member playing
strengths. 36 Each of these anti-competitive practices has been up-
held either by judicial3 7 or legislative action.
3 8
30. Municipalities compete against one another in the number of guaranteed ticket
sales, length of interest-free loans, and size of training facilities they offer an owner to
remain in or to relocate to their city. Johnson, supra note 19, at 230.
31. Some might argue that taxpayers can protect themselves and dissuade local offi-
cials from entering into the type of stadium lease discussed throughout this Current
Topic by simply utilizing the electoral process. Yet the electoral process cannot serve as
a corrective device. If taxpayers are unhappy with an official about the terms of a lease,
they can vote that official out of office, but the lease may remain in effect years later. In
addition, it is more politically beneficial for an official to land a team than it is harmful
for that official to enter into a bad lease. Axthelm & Murr, supra note 23, at 21.
32. Because demand exceeds supply, owners can negotiate more favorable leases
than they would be able to if the supply were allowed to grow to meet demand. John-
son, supra note 17, at 522.
33. For an analysis why mandatory expansion of the professional leagues is not an
effective policy, see infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
34. Meggyesy, supra note 22, at 18.
35. Morris, In the Wake of Flood, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 85, 86 (1973).
36. Quirk, supra note 2, at 43-47.
37. "Courts have long recognized that professional sports leagues are unlike ordi-
nary businesses and are unique in their basic structures. As a consequence it has been
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As a consequence of this governmental protection, no adequate
market mechanism exists to secure public investment in sport.
Franchise owners do not have any incentive to self-regulate
franchise movement. It is clearly in their interest to move their
teams to the highest potential revenue use. 39 Because owners pool
gate receipts and television revenues, relocation to achieve a higher
return also serves the interest of non-relocating owners. In addi-
tion, pooling creates an incentive for an owner to seek conces-
sions. 40 Moreover, the professional leagues do not have an interest
in monitoring franchise movement4' because the league structure
makes it virtually impossible for a competing league to survive for
an extended period of time.
4 2
accepted that some restrictions on competition in business practices may be necessary in
order to promote competition on the playing field." Professional Sports Antitrust Im-
munity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259, S. 298 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 283 (1985) (paper by Morton Rosenburg entitled Proposed Sports
Relocation Legislation: Background and Legal Implications, at CRS-6 n. 23) [hereinaf-
ter Professional Sports Immunity]. Rosenburg cites several cases in support of this prop-
osition, including Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and MacKey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1973).
38. For example: current tax policy permits team owners to depreciate the value of
players' contracts, I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988); an antitrust exemption allows sports leagues
to negotiate contracts for the right to televise league members' games, Pub. L. No. 87-
331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)); another antitrust exemp-
tion facilitated the merger between the NFL and the American Football League, Pub. L.
No. 89-800, § 6(b)(l), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
39. Each league has rules regulating an owner's ability to relocate. This type of rule
was at issue in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). For further discus-
sion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 57-62. In order to move a franchise,
an owner must receive approval from the other owners. Historically, receiving this ap-
proval has not proven difficult. It is in each owner's interest to approve the relocation
plans of another owner because she might want to relocate in the future. When a reloca-
tion bid has been voted down, it has most often been because the owner making the
request was disliked by the other owners. As a result, Bill Veeck and Charlie Finley [and
Al Davis] are the only owners whose bids have not been approved. Quirk, supra note 2,
at 48-51.
40. Each professional league has some form of revenue sharing, although they differ
markedly among the professional leagues. Id. at 45. Thus, the only way for an owner to
make a profit above the league norm is to exploit those aspects of the sports business
that are not under league control. One such area is the revenue generated from conces-
sions present in the stadium lease. By obtaining the maximum amount of concessions
during bargaining, an owner can cut costs and thereby increase profits above the league
norm.
41. Franchise movement does have a downside for a league, however. Relocation is
detrimental for a league as a whole because relocation breaks down relationships be-
tween communities and teams. Effler, supra note 10, at 24. This is another important
aspect of sport that differentiates it from non-sport industries. For a discussion of other
differences, see infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
42. Rival leagues represent the only potential market mechanism to combat the anti-
trust advantages granted to professional leagues. Even when they win, they lose. In
United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y.




Thus, due to past governmental action (and inaction) and to the
structure of professional leagues, local officials are unable to bar-
gain adequately for conditions that will protect a city's financial and
emotional investment in a franchise. In the absence of federal gov-
ernment support, if a city attempts to protect its taxpayers by incor-
porating into its stadium lease conditions similar to those advocated
by this Current Topic, that city will either be forced to back down or
to lose its team. At the bargaining table, an owner can afford to call
a city's bluff because many other teamless cities will not demand
such protection for their taxpayers. The professional leagues are
organized to protect the interests of the owners; an individual city's
ability to protect its interests during negotiations is limited because
no adequate method exists for cities to band together to insist on
conditions that will protect all taxpayers. Only through federal gov-
ernment involvement can inequities in the sports franchise market
be corrected and taxpayer investment be protected.
III. Non-Competitive Markets and Ramifications For Taxpayers
A discussion of proposed governmental intervention into the bar-
gaining process raises two related questions: first, how is the sports
industry different from non-sport industries; and second, if public
policy does mandate federal government involvement, why should it
regulate sports franchise relocation when similar problems exist in
non-sport industries.43
A. Why the Sports Industry Differs From Other Industries
Franchise owners are involved in the sports industry to make a
profit, and any regulatory solution to the franchise relocation prob-
lem must allow team owners the opportunity to make a return on
their investment. Yet sports franchises have, over time, come to
represent something more than simply another means to reach a
profitable end. A sports franchise also functions as a cohesive ele-
(2d Cir. 1988), the district court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the USFL antitrust claims and motion for a new trial on damages, upholding
the jury-determined damages award of $1 for NFL violations of federal antitrust laws.
Most expansion leagues fail, however. Moreover, if an expansion league has shown that
it can compete with an established league, it is in the interest of both leagues to merge. A
merger will reduce player salaries and thus increase owner profits. Meggyesy, supra note
22, at 20. See also Morris, supra note 35, at 96.
43. Johnson, supra note 5, at 15. For a general discussion of how sports franchises
can be distinguished from other businesses, see Note, The Constitutionality of Taking a
Sports Franchise by Eminent Domain and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict
Franchise Relocation, 13 Fordham Urban L.J. 553, 574, 584-85 (1985).
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ment for a city. The nature of sports competition in America creates
a "home team," and this identification of a team with a community is
an important difference between sport and non-sport industries.
Consider the following passages:
Oakland is a poor community. It has severe unemployment; it has had
auto plant closings. But the one thing that has helped Oakland rebuild
since its real demise began after the Second World War has been its
professional sports franchises. It has been a unifying factor between
labor and management and between rich and poor. 4
4
When we won the Super Bowl, we had a parade and a million people
turned out. They represented every age group, every racial back-
ground, every economic and social value on earth. And they climbed
on top of the Stock Exchange Building and they stood out on ledges of
high rise buildings and they said one thing-thank you. And this is the
public interest that exists in major league sports and football. 4 5
The bonds that develop between a city and a team make sports
special. While workers in a non-sport firm might celebrate a com-
pany achievement, such as record profits, that celebration does not
overflow into the lives of non-plant employees as reaction to a
sporting event does. 4 6 For this reason, sports franchise movements
produce intangible as well as economic effects different from those
resulting from plant relocations and closings in non-sport
industries.
B. Justifications For Government Involvement
The federal government has long been deeply involved in the reg-
ulation of sports. Actions by the Supreme Court in the area of anti-
trust law and by Congress through legislation concerning television
broadcast rights, league mergers, and depreciation of assets have
enabled franchise owners to maintain their negotiation advantage
over cities. It is difficult to imagine how taxpayers would have been
affected if both the judicial system and Congress had acted differ-
ently, but the federal government is involved beyond the point of
attempting to minimize the scope of its influence over professional
sports by not monitoring franchise movement. 4 7 It alone has the
44. Johnson, supra note 19, at 223.
45. Id.
46. Sport also serves a different function than publicly subsidized industries. While
symphonies, opera companies, and repertory theaters exist in part because of public
subsidies, the author would contend that these activities do not serve as means for
bringing together people of vastly different viewpoints, as sport does. Moreover, they
tend not to have the same kind of economic impact on a city as a sports franchise.
47. Gorton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Introductory Views from the




regulatory power at its disposal to protect taxpayers by overcoming
the association problems presented by the desires of competing
cities .48
Because the business aspects of professional sports touch upon
numerous points of federal concern, Congress is the appropriate
body to regulate franchise movement. 49 Local communities have
done everything within their power to prevent franchise relocation.
Their efforts have failed not because they bargained poorly, but be-
cause of the lack of competitiveness caused by the league struc-
ture. 50 Moreover the federal government, rather than the individual
state governments, must regulate franchise relocations because of
the commerce and antitrust questions which surround team move-
ment. Finally, but for the federal government's past involvement,
the situation for taxpayers would be much better. For example, by
allowing the pooling of television revenues, Congress has made it
financially possible for owners to leave high market share cities for
cities with better deals, but lower shares.
5'
The inability of Congress or the courts to formulate a response
sufficient to secure community investment in sports teams is star-
tling. Absent local subsidies, professional leagues could not exist
today in their present form. 52 Unlike other industries where Con-
gress has broken down barriers to stimulate more competition, in
the sports industry the federal government has helped foster a
league structure that allows franchise owners to exploit taxpayers.
The time has come for Congress and the courts to recognize offi-
cially the role taxpayers play in the operation of professional sports
and to protect that group, just as it has protected the professional
leagues and the owners. By taking such action, Congress would ex-
plicitly affirm both the importance of taxpayer dollars to the opera-
48. Johnson, supra note 5, at 11; Meggyesy, supra note 22, at 17. But see Gattuso,
Congress and Rule-Making, Society, May/June 1986, at 6; Rosenberg, Simple Problems,
Simple Solution, Society, May/June 1986, at 24.
49. Professional Sports Immunity, supra note 37, at 308-13 (for example, antitrust,
tax, labor, immigration, and communication law).
50. "In sum, there is a national problem, beyond the ability of cities or private par-
ties to resolve: in these circumstances, I believe that a legislative solution is necessary
and appropriate." Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259,
S. 298 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985) (Sena-
tor Spector's response to question asking if local communities and private parties had
done enough on their own to avoid problems caused by terms of contracts they negoti-
ated with sports franchises).
51. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S.172, S. 259, S. 298
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1985) (corre-
spondence between Senator Spector and NFL Commissioner Peter Rozelle).
52. Johnson, supra note 17, at 519.
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tion of the sports industry and the unique consequence of sports
competition-the intangible benefits created by the relationship of
fans with their home team.
IV. Government Response To The Relocation Problem
The plight of local taxpayers caused by franchise movement has
not gone totally unnoticed by the federal government. Over its past
four terms Congress has considered several pieces of legislation
aimed at protecting local communities. However, none of these
proposed legislative solutions has gained sufficient support to be-
come law. Team relocation has had its day in court as well, yet the
judicial system has failed to create any additional protection for af-
fected taxpayers. The following sections analyze why these federal
efforts to regulate franchise relocation on behalf of local taxpayers
have been insufficient.
A. Litigation
With the exception of major league baseball, all professional
sports leagues are subject to federal antitrust laws. 53 While these
leagues have been unsuccessful in achieving the complete exemp-
tion enjoyed by baseball, courts have upheld league attempts to
deny transfers of franchise ownership, 54 to control membership, 55
and to expand during the formation of a rival league 56 on the
grounds that these practices were necessary to provide balanced and
honest competition. However, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Los An-
geles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League57 dramat-
ically changed the way in which antitrust laws are applied to
restrictions placed on franchise movement by the professional
leagues.
Before the Raiders case, membership decisions concerning in-
traleague franchise movement were exempt from antitrust scru-
53. The Supreme Court granted MLB an antitrust exemption that permits it to con-
duct its affairs outside the federal antitrust statutes in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). This antitrust exemption was upheld in Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), but
has been denied to other leagues. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957) (football); Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (bas-
ketball); Nassua Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (hockey).
54. Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 561 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
56. AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).





tiny. 58 However, the Ninth Circuit in Raiders upheld the district
court's decision that the NFL's rule governing franchise relocation 59
was, in this instance, a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 60 Although Raiders involved a NFL franchise, its
resolution has put each professional league's authority to regulate
franchise movement in doubt;6' since 1982, five teams in three
leagues have either moved or attempted to move. 6
2
The Raiders litigation has led cities to attempt to acquire owner-
ship of a franchise through eminent domain actions. Eminent do-
main describes the government's power to take property from an
unwilling property owner for a public use. In 1980, the city of Oak-
land brought an eminent domain action to acquire the Oakland
Raiders football team. After protracted litigation, which culminated
in a California Supreme Court holding that California eminent do-
main law provided a city the opportunity to prove "public use,"
63
the California Court of Appeals upheld the lower court judgment on
remand that any eminent domain acquisition of the Raiders by Oak-
land was invalid under the commerce clause. 64 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus ending the city's hopes of
keeping the Raiders in Oakland. 65 Four years later, the city of Balti-
more filed an eminent domain action to keep the Colts from moving
to Indianapolis. This action was dismissed by the federal district
court on procedural grounds.
66
58. San Francisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal.
1974).
59. The NFL's relocation rule (Rule 4.3) required unanimous approval from league
members before a franchise could relocate into the home territory of another franchise.
The NFL lowered this requirement to three-fourths of league members after the unsuc-
cessful suit by the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. Los Angeles Coliseum Commis-
sion v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Weistart, League
Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in
the Sports Industry, 1984 Duke LJ. 1013, 1015 (1984).
60. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1385. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
61. See National Basketball Ass'n v. San Diego Clipper Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1987) (challenge by NBA franchise to NBA relocation restrictions).
62. Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act: Congress' Best Re-
sponse to Raiders?, 38 Hastings LJ. 345, 351 (1987).
63. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
64. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 421, 220 Cal. Rptr.
153, 157 (1985).
65. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986). For an in-depth
discussion of the Raiders litigation, see Note, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74
Calif. L. Rev. 1329 (1986).
66. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club, 624 F. Supp. 278
(D. Md. 1986).
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B. Legislation
Franchise relocation became a major Congressional issue as a re-
sult of the Raiders litigation. 67 The legislation introduced in Con-
gress to correct the problems associated with sports team relocation
contained a variety of proposals designed to protect local communi-
ties: additional antitrust exemptions, sports arbitration boards,
mandatory expansion, and first-refusal rights. 68 Congress did not
adopt any of these solutions. These methods were insufficient to
protect community investment because they failed to reduce the in-
equities present during lease negotiations.
1. Additional antitrust exemptions. Representative Stark69 and
Senators Eagleton 70 and DeConcini 7 1 introduced bills that granted
further antitrust exemptions to the professional leagues to allow
them to divide revenues in a manner promoting competition.
7 2
These bills also upheld league rules authorizing league members to
decide if a relocation could occur. 73 An additional bill introduced
by Representative Stark amended the existing exemption concern-
ing the pooling of telecasting revenues to include pay-television
revenues.74
The exemptions mentioned above do little to reduce the inequali-
ties created by the league structure for they do nothing more than
codify what leagues are already doing.75 Even if legislation incorpo-
rating these or similar exemptions had passed, local taxpayers
would not be better off. Owners would still be able to play one city
off of another and to relocate without having to consider the true
costs of the relocation.
67. Professional Sports Immunity, supra note 37, at 314.
68. All legislation described in this section can be traced to one of two legislative
origins. S. 3183, introduced by Senator Magnuson, is representative of the restrictive
category of relocation proposals, while S. 2784, introduced by Senator DeConcini, is
indicative of the variety of legislation that would solve the relocation problem by grant-
ing further autonomy to the leagues. Id.
69. H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
70. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
71. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
72. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(2) (1985); S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(l)(b) (1985); H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(l)(b) (1982).
73. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(l) (1985); S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(l)(a) (1985); H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(l)(a) (1982).
74. H.R. 823, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. § 7(2) (1982).





2. Mandatory expansion. Legislation introduced by Senator
Gorton required both the NFL and MLB to expand.76 Senator
Eagleton's bill, while not requiring expansion, mandated that each
league have an expansion policy.
77
Forced expansion of the professional leagues would reduce the
owners' bargaining power generated by their ability to control the
supply of franchises. However, mandatory expansion is not an ap-
propriate solution to the problem of franchise relocation because it
involves the federal government too deeply in the running of a pro-
fessional league. The government would have to decide how many
new franchises each league could support, determine which cities
were eligible for expansion and in what sports, and enforce its deci-
sions. Although a city may be able to support a franchise, it is not
entitled to one; the government must involve itself only so far as to
make the position of the owners and the cities at the bargaining ta-
ble equal.
78
3. First-refusal rights. Several bills introduced into Congress
required that before a relocation could take place, any parties who
met league ownership criteria and pledged that they would not
move the franchise be given an opportunity to buy the franchise. 79
A franchise owner has the right not only to decide when to sell
her franchise, but also to select to whom she will sell it. Although
first-refusal rights is an attractive solution to the relocation problem,
it tips the balance too far in the cities' favor. The right of first-re-
fusal fails as an appropriate solution because it impinges on an
owner's inherent right to select a buyer; to some owners, the iden-
tity of the buyer will be more important than the amount of money
included in the deal.
4. Sports arbitration boards. Almost all of the bills provided for
the creation of a process to determine if a franchise relocation was
necessary and appropriate. The bills introduced by Senators
Eagleton and Gorton each incorporated an elaborate set of crite-
ria,80 but most often a relocation was judged on the adequacy of the
76. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1985). Similar legislation was introduced
in the House by Representative Mikulski. See H.R. 885, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303
(1985).
77. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1985).
78. One additional disadvantage of forced expansion is that it would essentially pre-
clude any rival league from becoming established.
79. See S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 2505, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
H.R. 5430, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5388, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
80. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Eagleton); S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (Gorton).
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current playing facilities, the existence of a breach of a condition in
the stadium lease, and the level of revenue generated by the
franchise. Senate Bill 172 is representative of the legislation utiliz-
ing this three-part test.8 '
This approach is inappropriate because market forces, not polit-
ical ones, should control franchise movement. Reliance on the mar-
ket produces an objective standard to review relocations. If a
relocation, after considering all costs, is profitable, the relocation
will occur. If the costs of a relocation are greater than the expected
increase in profits, the relocation will not occur. In contrast, both
the legislative selection and application of franchise relocation criteria
are subjective. Thus, there is no guarantee that profitable moves will
not be rejected and that more costly moves will not be approved.
Moreover, neither the taxpayers' nor the owners' interests are pro-
tected by the use of an arbitration system. Congress, by requiring
owner contribution, minimum lease lengths, and leasehold payback,
would reduce the inequities caused by the owners' ability to control
the supply of franchises and create a situation where market forces
would monitor relocations.
V Market Incentives and Taxpayer Protection
The type of federal involvement outlined in this Current Topic is
modeled after the action taken by Congress to correct the unequal
bargaining position of non-union employees when it introduced na-
tional minimum workplace standards and actions taken by state and
local governments to protect tenants by implementing building
codes. Before minimum wage laws, not only were individual work-
ers unable to bargain with employers for higher wages, but they
were forced by market incentives to accept wages at below market
levels. Similarly, before implementation of building codes, tenants
could not bargain for adequate housing conditions, and market
forces created incentives for tenants to accept below standard hous-
ing. In both instances, for the pubic good, the government imposed
its authority to overcome the collective action problems of the non-
union employees and tenants. The adoption of federal standards
for stadium leases8 2 would reduce the negative effects on taxpayers
of league revenue sharing and league control of the supply of
81. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985).
82. Modification of this aspect of professional sports is not so broad as to infringe
upon the property rights of sports franchise owners (as would forced league expansion)
nor so narrow as to alter how professional leagues function (as would a change in the





franchises by removing the incentives for relocation which those
practices create.
s3
The standards that, by their incorporation into a stadium lease,
would reduce incentives for owners to relocate and thereby create a
more equal bargaining environment are described below and dis-
cussed in turn:
(1) a notification period of at least the length of one season of the
sport involved to allow local officials time to consider ownership
demands;
(2) an agreement that if the franchise moves before the expiration of
the lease, the owner will pay the cost of the leasehold improvements
contained in the agreement, less depreciation;
(3) a required monetary contribution from the owner based on the
level of public financing spent on leasehold improvements; and
(4) an established minimum length of the lease based on the level of
public financing spent on leasehold improvements.
A. Imposition of a Notice Requirement
The requirement that an owner give notice of any proposed
agreement to relocate at least a season in advance is probably the
most important of the proposed standards. Notice minimizes an
owner's ability to bargain for lease concessions by threatening to
immediately relocate to another city, as the owner of the Houston
Oilers did with Jacksonville 84 and the Philadelphia Eagles did with
Phoenix. 5 Under this proposal, if either franchise had threatened
to move without giving notice, their owners would either have been
making idle threats or, in the event of a move, given cause for a
83. Both revenue sharing and owner control of supply affect lease negotiations. See
supra text accompanying note 40 (revenue sharing); supra text accompanying notes 31-33
(owner control).
The federal government would have the power to enforce these lease agreements
without interfering with state sovereignty. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that the only
limit on the federal commerce power as applied to the states is that inherent in all con-
gressional action: the built-in restraints that our system provides through participation
in federal government action. 469 U.S. at 556. Therefore, application of the minimum-
wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a municipally
owned-and-operated mass transit system was not violative of either state sovereignty or
any constitutional provision.
84. See supra text accompanying note 16.
85. The city of Philadelphia, under the Eagles' threat of relocation to Phoenix,
signed a ten-year lease which required the city to construct 50-80 sky boxes at no cost to
the Eagles, with all of the revenues from the leasing of these boxes going to the team.
The city will also spend $500,000 to construct and furnish additional field boxes, the
revenue from which will be allocated to the franchise. Other provisions of the new
agreement include additional team-related facilities, rent deferral, and game-day secur-
ity. The total cost to the city is estimated at $30 million. Baade, supra note 17, at 9.
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breach of contract suit. Had this condition been included as part of
its stadium lease, the city of Baltimore could have brought suit for
breach of contract against the Colts as a result of their midnight
move, rather than having to sue on the unreliable theory that
through the use of eminent domain, they could acquire the Colts.
Notice benefits a city in several other important ways. First, it cre-
ates a "cooling-off" period in which city officials can decide whether
continued association with the sports franchise is desirable. Second,
it allows a city to cease futher allocations of public funds for
franchise-related items. Finally, it provides notice that the team and
the business it generates will be leaving, thus allowing time for local
businesses to adjust their economic forecasts.
B. Payment for Leasehold Improvements
The cost of constructing a new stadium or remodeling an existing
stadium as part of an agreement made by a city to keep or to attract
a team is a public subsidy. It is a cost to the local taxpayers that is
external8 6 to the franchise owner. Because owners are not required
to reimburse cities for stadium improvements if they move their
franchises prematurely, owners do not consider these costs when
computing their costs of relocation. If an owner is forced to assume
the cost of lease-hold improvements when relocating, the costs of
relocation will be higher and the movement of the franchise will be
less attractive. Fewer relocations may be the result. Payment of
leasehold improvements does not penalize an owner, nor does it in
any way take away an owner's right to move. It serves as an effective
taxpayer protection because it forces an owner to consider the true
costs of a move, thus reducing the franchise value created when
owners artificially restrict the level of supply.
C. Required Financial Contribution
A city should not accept all of the risks associated with stadium
financing. Requiring franchise owners to contribute towards the fi-
nancing of either building a stadium or upgrading an existing facil-
ity after allocation of a federally-determined8 7 amount of municipal
86. Internal costs are those costs that are included in the price of an item. A pur-
chaser must consider these costs before acting. External costs represent costs that are
not included in the price of an item. External costs are costs that a purchaser does not
have to consider explicitly before acting.
87. To determine the proper level of public and private financing for stadium im-
provements, Congress should utilize the accepted percentage used in the commercial




funds will lessen the risks to the host city. In addition, tying the
financial well-being of the owner to the city reduces incentives for
franchise movement. If an owner does decide to relocate, this lease
provision would require that the owner continue to service the pub-
lic debt in proportion to his financial contribution to the funding of
the stadium. The city of Toronto signed a lease that required the
city to pay $50 million to expand its baseball facility if plans for a
domed stadium fell through.88 Inclusion of a clause in the lease that
put a percentage of the financing burden on the owner would create
an incentive for that owner to make sure that the more cost effective
of the two options was built, thus reducing the level of public financ-
ing and liability.
D. Required Length of Lease
A lease provision that requires the length of the stadium lease to
increase with the level of public financing would provide a clear
choice for the owner-more public funding or a shorter lease. Simi-
lar to the contribution levels of financing, the schedule determining
the length of the lease would be prescribed by the federal govern-
ment and not be subject to negotiation.
89
With this trade-off required by law, Robert Irsay still might have
been able to negotiate a five-year lease with the city of Baltimore,
but he would not have received the $24 million in stadium improve-
ments. Had he insisted on receiving funding for the improvements,
the lease would have been longer. This provision would have cor-
rected what is possibly the worst example of the type of risks cities
are forced to accept because of the imperfect market for sports
franchises. In early 1980, Minneapolis faced the possibility that
both of its professional franchises would relocate. In response to
this threat, the city built a $76.5 million domed facility. 90 In spite of
this show of financial support, soon thereafter the city again faced
the threat that one of its franchises would leave. A clause in the
lease with the Twins allowed the franchise to annul its lease if the
team did not draw 2.4 million fans in 1984, although the Twins had
sents a commitment on behalf of the buyer; the required contribution clause is meant to
do no more than to provide a mechanism for cities to receive a financial commitment
from owners.
88. Baade, supra note 17, at 9.
89. Congress should determine the appropriate schedule of length of lease based on
the following proposition: the length of the lease should be at least as long as the time
required for the asset to depreciate to a net value of zero, assuming the use of generally
accepted accounting principles and no salvage value.
90. Superdome, supra note 10, at 110.
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never drawn more than 1.5 million fans in any one season. 9 1 The
team stayed when local businesses bought enough tickets to guaran-
tee that at least 2.4 million tickets would be sold.
Conclusion
Under present league rules and government regulations, a com-
petitive market for professional sports franchises does not exist.
This lack of a competitive market has created inequities that force
local officials to put the taxpayers they represent at substantial risk
during negotiations to acquire or to retain a franchise. Because
market forces are restricted, the supply of sports teams is kept artifi-
cially below the level of demand and the costs of relocating are
much lower than they might be otherwise. Team owners do not
have to consider the true costs, both internal and external, when
deciding whether to relocate. The judiciary and the federal legisla-
ture have neglected to incorporate market analysis in their efforts to
protect the investments of local taxpayers. The proposal set forth in
this Current Topic argues for a market-based solution to the
franchise relocation problem.
Congress must take steps to establish an environment in the pro-
fessional sports industry that emulates a truly competitive market.
Implementation of non-negotiable standards for stadium leases will
create a balance at the bargaining table between franchise owners
and municipal officials. As a result, taxpayers will be protected and
owners will still be able to relocate their sports franchises. While
future franchise movements will be more expensive, the higher costs
will more accurately reflect the costs of relocation to all parties.
Under this regulatory scheme, some owners will still find it more
profitable to move. Others, when forced to reimburse cities for the
economic and psychological damages caused by a relocation, will
stay, realizing that there really is no place like home.
91. Alm, supra note 17, at 51.
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